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Abstract
This paper presents the results of a bilateral gift exchange experiment in which mutual gift
giving is efficient but gifts are individually costly. We compare the results for Norway and
the Netherlands and for two information treatments: one with and one without information
about previous gifts. We find that average gifts are higher in Norway. Furthermore, gifts are
higher when information is provided about the previous gift. A model of individual behaviour
suggests that Norwegian and Dutch subjects behave similarly along the egoist-altruist
dimension. The observed differences in behaviour can be fully rationalised by a difference in
the degree of reciprocity, with Norwegian subjects having more concerns for reciprocity.
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There is an ongoing debate on the question whether individuals are rational and self-
interested pay-off maximizers, or motivated by non-monetary, social considerations. This
discussion is strongly inspired by results from economic experiments with e.g. ultimatum
games (see, for instance, Guth and Tietz, 1990, for a survey) and public goods (see, for
instance, Ledyard, 1995, for a survey), which show that people often do not act in line with
standard maximising behaviour. Some authors have claimed that the observed deviations
from economic rationality are not so severe and can be attributed to specific justifications
such as inexperience or confusion (e.g., Binmore et al. 1985 and 1988 and Andreoni, 1995).
Others have argued that many people are not rational and selfish but are at least partially
motivated by social norms such as trust, reciprocity and altruism, which in their view exist as
primitives of human behaviour (Berg et al., 1995, Fehr et al., 1993, Guth and Tietz, 1990).
Yet another explanation is that peopte bchave stratcgically. Fut e,tarnple, substantial offers in
the ultimatum game could be explained by the fear that small offers will be rejected
(Prasnikar and Roth, 1992 and Straub and Mutnighan, 1995). Pillutla and Murnighan (1995)
argued that in their experiment only very few people were actually fair; most people just
wanted to appear fair.' Finally, it has been shown that the presence and impact of social
concerns may be context related (Roth et al., 1991, Van der Heijden et al. 1997).
In this paper, we take the view that individual behaviour is sometimes motivated by social
concerns, and sometimes by pure self-interest, according to some random mechanism that is
not the outcome of conscious deliberation, but that may depend on the specific characteristics
of the choice situation in which the individual finds herself. Based on this general idea, we
formulate a model of individual behaviour and apply it to data from a cross-cultural
experiment with the gift exchange game of Van der Heijden et al. (1997). The purpose is to
identify possible differences in behaviour across different populations of players, and relate
them to differences in attitudes towards trust, reciprocity and altruism.
This paper contributes to the existing literature by examining the role of social concetns in a
gift exchange setting in two countries: Norway and the Netherlands. The comparison between
various countries is not only interesting from an experimental point of view, but it could also
be important for economic policy. With the upcoming EMU and the resulting harmonisation
of several political systems, it seems useful to know if people in various European countries
have similaz ideas about social norms. In particular as regards social security systems, people
~ In an ultimau[um game environment Pillutla and Mttmighan ( 1995) found that offerers made offers [hat
appeared fair only when responders had full information about the money to be divided or when third parties
labelled offers as to [heir faimess.
1favour systems that they consider to be fair. Whether social norms are stable across
populations is an interesting question, which thus far has not received much attention in the
experimental literature.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The next section introduces the gift
exchange game and discusses results from some related er.periments. Section 3 presents the
experimental procedure of our bilateral gift exchange experiment. Section 4 discusses the
general data. In Section 5, we present and estimate a model of individual behaviour. The last
section contains a summary of the results and a concluding discussion.
2. Social concerns, the gift exchange game and related experiments
In this section we describe the most important features of the gift exchange game. In addition,
we explain our interpretation of several social concems and discuss some related literature.
2.1 Social concerns and the gift exchange game
The gift exchange game is a two-period game played by two players. In the first period,
player 1 has to decide on his gift to player 2. In the second period, player 2 has to choose her
gift to player 1. The game is designed such that mutual gift giving is socially efficient but
individually costly. The unique Nash equilibrium of this game is that both players give
nothing. The reason is that player 1 should realise that it is a dominant strategy for player 2 to
give nothing, and therefore he should transfer nothing too. We study two versions of this
game. In one treatment, called the infotmation treatment, player 2 knows the size of the gift
made by player 1 when she decides on her gift to player L In the no-information treatment,
player 2 is not informed about the gift by player I when she decides on her gift.' Both
treatments have been conducted in Norway and the Netherlands. Details are given in the
section 3.
The design of the gift exchange game allows us [o examine the possible effects of reciprocity,
trust and altruism.' Perhaps even more important is the fact that we will be able to disentangle
their impacts, as we will see later. Because the notions of reciprocity, trust, and altruism play
~ Actually, from a game-theoretic perspective the two versions ofthc game, i.e. the [wo treatmenu, aze different
games. For instance, the svategy space is different as well as the argument for getting at the equilibrium outcome
of no transfers (see section 3).
3 We do not intend to claim that other social concems like distribiutional justice (e.g., Bolton et al. Ockenfels,
1997) could not play a role as well, but we want to focus on wha[we [hink are the most relevant motivations for
the present situation.
2a central role in this study and because their exact meaning is not unambiguous in the
literature, we first want to elaborate somewhat on what we mean by these concepts.
Our basic view is that reciprocity has to do with conditional behaviour in the sense of
Gouldner (1960, p. 171) `we owe others certain things because of what they have previously
done for us'. According to this definition of reciprocity people react to observed behaviour.
Feelings of reciprocity then imply that people are willing to help those who are being kind to
them and to punish those who are being unkind (Rabin, 1993, p. 1282). Notice that this
definition allows for both positive and nega[ive fotms of reciprocity.'
Feelings of altruism constitute another form of social concerns. In contrast to reciprocity, we
see altruism as a kind of unconditional behaviour. The common interpretation of altruism
among economists follows Becker (1981), who defines al[ruism as `to at[ach a positive value
to payoffs to others' (see also Andreoni, 1989 and 1990).
The last form of social motivations that is relevant for our purpose is trust. As regazds trust
we follow Berg et al. who recendy defined ttust in [erms of the following two actions (Berg et
al. 1995, p. 126). First, the trustor gives a trustee the right to make a decision, and, second,
the trustee makes a decision which affec[s both [rustor and trustee. According to Berg et al.
subjects have used ttvst to facilitate exchange if the following conditions are met: a) placing
ttust in the trustee puts the trustor at risk; b) the trusteés decision benefits the trustor at a cost
to the trustee; and c) both trustor and trustee aze better off by the transaction compared to the
situation without trust and exchange.' Similar definitions of trust are operationalised in the
social psychology literature (see, e.g., Webb and Worchel, 1986).
2.2 Related experiments
Our study of the gift exchange game is related to two strands of literature that we will next
review briefly: The first one is a series of experiments that considers the concepts of trust and
reciprocity, namely Berg et al., 1995, Ortmann et al., 1996, Forsythe et al., 1995, Gáchter and
Falk, 1997, and the second one consists of studies that aze concemed with cross-cultural
yThe interpretation of reciprocity we stick to here is only applicable in specific situations, that is, when actions
can be observed. Instead ofreacting to observed behaviour, people may reciprocate anticipated behaviour.
Although this Ia[ter definition is rather popular in the litearure (see, e.g., Sugden, 1984, Rabin, 1993, and
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 1998) in our view the fomier one is more applicable to the giftexchane game
situation. We do not want to go into more detail here, but refer to the discussion in Van der Heijden et al.
(1997).
s All these condítions are met in the gif[ exchange experiment presented here. It therefore makes sense to
discuss [he role of trust in this game and compare it with the results obtained by Berg e[ al. (1995) and by
Ortmann et aL (1996) in their replication ofthe game.
3comparisons of experimental results (Roth et al., 1991, Cason et al., 1997, Brandts et al.,
1997).
Our gift giving game is somewhat similar to the well-known one-shot two-stage investment
game studied by Berg et al. (1995) and replicated by Ortmann et al. (1996). Berg et al. claím
that their results, which deviate considerably from outcomes predicted by game theory, show
that reciprocity and trust are basic elements of human behaviour. One could cast some doubt
on these results, however. First, although most first players seemed to trust their partners by
sending a positive amount, no evidence was found for reciprocity as defined above; the
correlation between the amount sent and the amount returned is only 0.01. A second remark
is that Ortmann et aL (1996) found much less support for the existence of trust and reciprocity
as a primitive when they replicated the investment experiment. Apparently, in the investment
game first players place considerable trust in the second players, but second players behave
only weakly reciprocally.
The role of trust in a message exchange setting has also been examined by Forsythe et al.
(1995). They studied an experimental market in which a seller is endowed with an asset, the
quality of which is private information to the seller. Sellers can send a cheap talk message to
buyers about the quality of the asset. The results reveal that sellers are quite willing to lie
about the quality of the asset. In fact, the messages contain almost no infotmation. It is
therefore rather surprising that the buyers continue to act as if they believed in the messages
of the sellers. As a result, buyers buy at too high prices and sellers gain at the expense of
buyers.
Fehr et al. have perfotrrted several studies to ezamine the possible effect of reciprocity in
experimental labour market situations (e.g., Fehr et al., 1993, 1997 and 1998, Kirchler et al.,
1996, and Gdchter and Falk, 1997). Their experiments are based on a two-stage game in
which employers first set a wage and then workers choose an effort level. Standard economic
theory predicts that the employers will offer the workers' reservation wage and the workers
will choose the minimum effort level. Their experimental results lend rather strong support
for the existence of reciprocal forces in several situations. For example, Gáchter and Falk
(1997) argue that a majority of the subjects behave genuinely reciprocally in a series of one-
shot bilateral gift exchange games comparable to the present game.
Now, if it is true that people do no[ always behave as rational pay-off maximizers, but are
also motivated by social norms like the reciprocity norm, it is not obvious that these norms
are equally important across cultures. Indeed, it seems natural that the occurcence and impact
of social norms varies across cultures. The empirical answer to this issue may yet be hazd to
4give using tield data. However, controlled laboratory experiments can be used [o provide
useful insights into this question.
In spite of the increasing literature on economic experiments, cross-cultural ezperimental
studies are still relatively rare. Although many experiments have been replicated in different
countries, most replications are not directly comparable because of differences in the
experimental design, e.g., differences in the amount of money at stake, the number of
repetitions or in wording or framing. One of the first real cross-cultural experimental studies
is a paper by Roth et al. (1991), in which they examined two different experimental situations
in four countries: Israel, Japan, the United States and Yugoslavia. They found no relevant
differences among countries in a market environment, but substantial differences in an
ultimatum-game situation.
Recently, two studies have been conducted that compare the effects of spite and co-operation
in public-good experiments with voluntary contribution mechanisms in several countries
(Cason et al., 1997, and Brandts et a1., 1997). The former paper studies voluntary
participation and spiteful behaviour in two treatments in the US and Japan, while the latter
one compares behaviour in Japan, the Netherlands, the US and Spain. Interestingly, observed
behaviour is rather similar across countries in the latter study, whereas Cason et al. find
significant differences between the Japanese and American subjects."
These findings illustrate again that results may be sensitive to [he context chosen and that
more experimental research is needed in order to draw conclusions. For instance, the question
whether or not social norms vary across countries is not yet settled. The current paper aims to
contribute to the existing literature by considering the role of social norms in a gift exchange
situation in Norway and the Netherlands.
It should be clear from our brief review of the experimental literature that the evidence on
reciprocity, trust and altruism is not conclusive. For example, the degree of observed
reciprocity vazies considerably between experiments, even in similaz situations. Furthetmore,
as experimental results turn out to be context-dependent, where context is meant in a broad
sense, e.g., including framing differences, one has to be careful when comparing and
interpreting results from various experiments. In cross-cultural experimental studies one
should in general be aware of at least three important potential risks: experimenter effects,
currency effects and language effects (see Roth et al., 1991). In our experiments on
reciprocity, trust and alttvism, we have tried to minimise these possible side effects in the
' See also I'turlando and Hey (1997) and Kachelmeier and Shehata (1992).
5following ways: The gift exchange game underlying the experiments was exactly the same in
both countries. Furthetmore, one of the experimenters was present during the experimental
sessions in both countries. Concerning the currency effect, the pay-off schedule used in the
Netherlands was transformed to the Norwegian schedule using the existing exchange rates.
Finally, the instructions were translated directly from Dutch to Norwegian by one of the
experimenters and controlled by a person who knows both languages. By taking these




The experiments are based on a simple two-person two-period gift exchange game. The
crucial feature of the game is that gift giving is individually costly, but mutual gift giving is
efficient. Each of the two players is "rich" in one period and "poor" in the other period. A rich
player has an endowment of 9, and a poor one has an endowment of 1. In the first period,
player 1 is rich and he decides on his gift Tl to player 2, who is poor. In the second period the
roles are reversed; player 2 is rich, player 1 is poor, and player 2 decides on her (return) gift
TZ to player l. Endowments and gifts together determine players' final asset levels in the two
periods. If player i gives a gift of Ti when he is rich, then his final assets in that period are 9-
Ti. If player i receives a gift of T~ when he is poor, then player i's final assets in that period
are ltT~. The pay-offs to player i are defined as the product of the final assets levels in the
two periods,
U~ - (9-T~)(T; t 1)k ~l)
where k is a constant used to transfotm the pay-offs in points to monetary eamings.
Ten sessions of the gift exchange game were run at Tilburg University in March 1995.
Another eleven sessions were run at the Norwegian School of Economics and Business
Administration in November 1996. In each country two treatments were run, one with
information and one without information. The four treatments form a 2x2 factorial design
with treatment variables country and information. In the information treatment, player 2 is
informed about player I's gift TI in the first period, when she chooses her gift TZ in the
second period. In the no-information treatment player 2 is not informed about T1 when she
chooses her gift T2. Table 1 summarises the design. The numbers between brackets indicate
the number of sessions in each treatment.
6Table 1: Overview of the experim
countrylinformation Information No information
Norway 6 5
Netherlands 5 5
Note that the only difference between the two information treatments is that in the
information treatment player 2 is informed about player 1's gift T1 in the first period, when
she decides on her gift T2 in the second period, whereas in the no-information treatment
player 2 is not informed about TI when she chooses her gift T2. Basically this means tha[ in
the no-information treatment players make their decisions simultaneously, whereas in the
information treatment decisions aze made sequentially. In all treatments, at the end of a
round, subjects were informed about their own pay-offs in that round and the transfer they
received. 30, at the end ot a round there is no difference in knowledge about the received
transfers between the information and the no-information treatment.
Obviously, there is a unique Nash-equilibrium for the no-information trea[ment game, and a
unique subgame perfect equilibrium for [he information version of it. Actually, it is fairly
easy to check that there is a unique Nash equilibrium for the information treatmen[ as well,
i.e. both variants of the game have a unique game theoretic solution, which is for both players
to give nothing.
Our motivation for including the no-information treatment in our experiment is to use it as a
control treatment. The design of the our experiment is such that reciprocity (in our definition
of conditional behaviour, that is as a reaction to observed behaviour) is possible in the
information treatment, i.e. when players have the possibility of monitoring previous transfers,
but not in the no-information treatment. On the other hand, altruism, which is unconditional
behaviour, is possible in both treatments. The design thus allows us to disentangle these
motives. We believe that this is a strong point of our design compared with some other
experiments, like for instance the investment game of Berg et al. (1995), in which it cannot be
excluded that subjects' behaviour is mainly driven by altruism instead of reciprocity.
~Experimenta! procedure
The procedure of the experiment was identical in Norway and the Netherlands. All sessions
were run with eight participants except for one session of the Norwegian information
treatment, which was tun with six participants.' A session typically lasted about an hour.
Upon arrival, subjects were randomly seated behind computer terminals, which were
separated by partitions. Instructions in the subjects' own language were distributed and read
aloud by the experimenter.e After that, subjects got several minutes to study the instructions
more carefully and to ask questions. Then one practice round was played.
After the practice round, the subjects played 15 repetitions of the gift exchange game. In each
round, the subjects were randomly and anonymously paired into four couples, and also
randomly assigned to be rich, i.e. the Decider, in either the first or the second period. For each
couple, the firs[ Decider made a transfer (Tl) to the first Receivec Then the two switched
roles, and the second Decider made a transfer (T2) to the second Receiver. Earnings in each
round (Ui) were denoted in points and calculated according to equation ( 1). Subjects could
also use a table included in the instructíons, which gave Ui as a function of Ti and Tj. This
pay-off table can be found in Appendix B. Subjects knew that points would be transferred to
money eamings at the end of the experiment at a fixed known rate. At the end of round I5,
the points eamed were accumulated and transfened into money earnings. Then an anonymous
questionnaire asked for some background information (gender, age, major, and motivation).
After that, subjects were privately paid their earnings in cash and left.
It is important to note that in every round a new random and anonymous assignment of the
players to the couples took place, i.e. that subjects were not matched with the same subjects
for all rounds. Furthermore, in each round it was randomly determined who was the first
Decider in each couple.
Pay-offs
Each point in the experiment in Norway and the Netherlands earned 20 0re and 5 cents,
respectively. In addition, Norwegian participants received 20 Norwegian Crowns for showing
up in time and the Dutch ones 5 Dutch Guilders.y
' The fact that one session had only 6 participants was not planned but occurred because of no shows. The
results ofthis session are not substantially different from those of other sessions with the same treatment.
e An English translation of the instructions can be found in Appendix B. Neutral terms were used in the
instructions. For example, in the period a player was rich he was referred to as the Decider, and in the period a
player was poor he was called the Receiver.
9 At the time of the experiment, one Norwegian Crown exchanged for about 0.27 Dutch Guilders, and one Dutch
Guilder was about 50.50. The po[en[ial earnings in both counvies are similar in relative terms. Expected
8Subjects
None of the participants had previous experience from any related experiment and none of
them participated more than once. The Norwegian participants were undergraduate and
graduate students from the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration in
Bergen. All these students studied (business) economics. They were mainly recruited by
posters and by entering classrooms, asking for participants for a decision-making experiment,
and promising monetary rewards contingent on performance. The Dutch participants were
undergraduate and graduate students from Tilburg University. These students came from
various disciplines like economics, law and psychology. Dutch participants were mainly
recruited by an announcement in the University Bulletin and by posters.
Cross-culturalcomparison
A comparison of Norway and the Netherlands in tcrms of aggregate measures will reveal
substantial similarities: Both are located on the North Sea coast, which historically has been a
tightly knit area of sea-borne trade and cultural exchange. Since the Second World War, both
countries have developed a Scandinavian type of welfare state, strongly rooted on the same
set of social democratic values. An obvious point of difference is their population densities,
where the two countries represent opposite extremes of the European spectrum. Despite that
fact, the proportion of Norwegian inhabitants living in urbanised areas in 1994 was as high as
73 per cent, as compared to 81 per cent for the Netherlands.'"
A more interesting difference concerns the degree of cultural heterogeneity in the two
countries. In recent years, the Netherlands has received a substantial number of immigrants
from Central and South America, Africa, Asia and the Middle East, and is now a multi-ethnic
and multi-cultural society with a strong intemational orientation. Norway, on the other hand,
has pursued a more isolationist policy, e.g. by choosing to stay outside the European Union,
and by pursuing a restrictive immigration policy. As a result, the Norwegian population is
much more homogeneous than the Dutch one.
This suggests that although our Dutch and Norwegian groups of subjects may share some
basic values of relevance to our experiment, they are different with respect to cultural
homogeneity, with Norwegian subjects as the more homogeneous group. This difference is
enhanced by the fact that the Norwegian subjects were all students of busíness economics at a
relatively small business school, while the Dutch subjects were recruited from various
earnings, based on previous experience of the experimenters, are somehat hígher than what students could earn
wíth one hour of work in, for instance, a bar.
'~ Statistical Yearbook 1996 for Norway and The Nethedands, respectively.
9disciplines at a lazger university. Social psychology, and in particular social identity theory
(Tajfel and Tumer, 1986), predicts that when subjects consider themselves to be member of a
group (or are more group-oriented) ít is more likely that they take the group-interest into
account than when they consider themselves as single individuals. As the Norwegian subjects
seem to be a more homogeneous group, this suggests that one could expect more co-operative
behaviour, i.e. higher gifts, in Norway than in the Netherlands. The validity of this argument
is tested in the nex[ sections.
4 The data
To get a first idea of the data obtained in both countries, Tables 2 and 3 present the average
transfers by player (averaged over the IS rounds of all relevant sessions) and the standazd
deviations for the treatments with and without information, respectively." The bottom row
shows whether the transfer by the first player (Tl) and the transfer by the second player (TZ)
are different in a particulaz treatment. The test used is a non-parametric Wilcoxon test with
session averages as units of observations.'~ The last column shows the results of a Mann-
Whitney test used to examine whether the average values of the first and second transfers
differ across Norway and the Netherlands. For both tests small p-values indicate significant
differences.
A first observation from the tables is that average transfers are positive, which contrasts the
game-theoretic prediction of zero transfers. Second, average transfers are higher in the
Norwegian treatments than in the corresponding Dutch treatments, in agreement with the
differences in cultural homogeneity and the predictions by social identíty [heory. Third, the
average transfer by the first player is much higher than the average transfer by the second
player for the information treatment; in both countries this difference is significant at a Sqo-
level (using Mann-Whitney tests). For the no-infortnation treatment, however, no significant
difference between the behaviour of first and second players can be observed. This is not
surprising given the fact that the No-information treatment is in fact a simultaneous move
game." More interestingly, the differences in behaviour by the same player across countries
are much smaller in the no-information treatment than in the treatment with information. This
suggests [hat [he observed difference in behaviour across countrres in the information
" Session averages are listed in tables A.I and A.2 in the appendix.
12 Because participants in[eract repeatedly within one session, da[a by round are not independent; only session
averages are vuly independen[.
'~ Note, however, that some studies have found that players moving second act differently than players moving
first, even though players are not informed about each other's move and are basically in an identical strategic
position (e.g., Morris et al. 1995).
10treatment be due to differences in [rus[ and reciprocity rather than differences in altruism
among the two groups of subjects.
Table 2. Average gifts by player and country for the information treatment
Norway Netherlands signi6cance
player 1(T1) 2.73(1.63) 2.10(1.74) p-0.07
player 2(T2) 1.06 ( I.70) 0.72 (1.54) p-0.10
Significance p-0.03 p-0.05
'Cable 3. Average gifts by player and country for the no-information treatment
Norway Netherlands significance
player 1(T1) 1.43 (1.92) 0.99 (1.50) p-0.35
player 2(T2) 1.21 (1.80) 1.03 (1.47) p-0.83
Significance p-0.35 p-0.69
The development of the transfers over time confirms these findings, see Figures la-ld. First,
all transfers decline over rounds, but last round transfers aze still positive. Furthermore, in
both countries T1 and T2 are (of course) indistinguishable in the no-information treatment,
which might be seen as evidence that the subjects understand the game. Mos[ importantly,
Figures la and lb show that the observation that the overall level of transfers is higher in the
information treatment is due to the persistently high level of Tl: In all rounds of the
Norwegian and Dutch information treatment the average value of T1 is about 2.5 - 3 times as
high as the average value of T2.
[Insert Figures la-id about here]
In order to gain some more insight, it is useful to consider the frequency distributions of the
transfers by first and second players. As regards the frequency distribution of the no-
information treatments, it turns out that the distributions of Tl and T2 aze very similar in each
country. Furthermore, the distributions do not differ across countries. In particular, the
percentage of zero transfers is SS.8qo in the Dutch no-information treatment and 56~Io in the
Norwegian one (cf. tables A4 and A6).
iiThe frequency distributions of T1 and T2 for the information treatments are depicted in
Figures 2a and 2b. Note first that the percentage of zero transfers by the second player is in
the neighbourhood of 70 per cent for both countries, and somewhat higher for the
Netherlands than for Norway. Thus, on average across both countries, some 70 per cent of
second players act in agreement with individual rationality, while the remaining 30 per cent
display non-egoistic behaviour by transferring positive amounts. Tuming next to the
distribution of transfers by first players, we see that the percentage of zero transfers is much
Iower in Norway than in the Netherlands (18 and 30 per cent, respectively). This indicates
that Norwegian first players aze either more al[ruistic than their Dutch counterparts, or if they
are driven by self-interest, that they place more trust in their partners. We have already seen
from the no-information treatments, however, that the two groups of subjects do not differ
significandy along the altruist dimension, and we are therefore led to conclude that it must be
a higher degree of trust among Norwegian subjects which is responsible for the higher
transfers by Norwegian first players in the information treatment.
[Insert Figures 2a and 2b about here]
We may get a second assessment of the likelihood of this explanation by considering the
frequency distribution of positive transfers made by firsi and second players in the
information treatment: In Norway, higher positive transfers occur more frequentiy than lower
ones for both players, at least for transfers in the interval [1,4], whereas in the Ne[herlands,
this only holds for first, but not for second players. Thus, it looks as if first players tend to
give high positive transfers in order to induce second players to give high transfers in retum,
but that the Norwegian firs[ players succeed better with that [han the Dutch onAs do.
Because reciprocity is defined as a systematic positive relationship between the transfer given
and the [ransfer returned, the correlation ccefficient between Tl and T2 gives an indication
for the presence of reciprocity. Across all sessíons and player pairs in the Norwegian
information treatment the correlation ccefficient between T1 and T2 is 0.19, while the
corresponding value for the Dutch information treatment is only 0.01. Furthermore, in the
first ten rounds of the Norwegian information treatment, the correlation ccefficient is
significantly positive and in some rounds quite high, around 0.5. In the Dutch information
treatment, on the other hand, the correlation ecefficient between T1 and TZ is close to zero in
all rounds.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
izThe distinction in the degree of recipocal behaviour between the two countries is also
illustrated by Figure 3, which shows the average value of the retutn transfer T2 given the first
transfer T1 for the information [reatment. The numbers above the bars indicates the
percentages of first transfers with that particular value. First transfers of 5 until 7 are pooled
because they are not so often observed. It is obvious from the figure that on average
recipocity is more observed in Norway, i.e. the average value of TZ increases with Tl for the
Norwegian treatment whereas for the Dutch no clear pattern can be observed. Hence the data
indicate that the degree of reciprocity among Norwegian subjects is higher than that among
their Dutch counterparts.
To summarise, average gifts are positive in all treatments, but considerably higher in the
infotrnation treatments, which results in more efficien[ outcomes and thus higher pay-offs.
Furthermore, in the information treatments, players seem to have trust in the decisions of
their partner, and therefore choose to make suhstantial transfers. In Norway, sawnd players
reciprocate this gift to some degree, but in the Netherlands, higher first transfers do not
induce higher transfers in retum. In the next section we will propose a model that captures
these and other aspects ofthe data.
5. A model of individual behaviour
The game-theoretic prediction for the gift exchange game is that both players will make a
zero transfer. For the no-information treatment, this follows if all players behave as pure
egoists, and for the information treatment, it follows by backward induction if it is common
knowledge that all players behave as pure egoists. However, pure egoism is not supported by
our experimen[al results: In the no-information treatment, 44 per cent of all transfers in both
countries were positive, despite the fact that positive transfers are costly for individual
players. It seems therefore that one must account for both altruistic and egoistic behaviour in
order to interpret the experimental results. For [hat purpose, we suggest the following model
of individual behaviour:
Suppose that in each decision situation, a player can be in one of two possible moral modes,
an egoistic mode, or an altruistic one. If a player is in the egoistic mode, he acts to maximise
his own pay-off, while in the altruistic mode, his acts are based on social considerations like
altruism and reciprocity. We shall assume that the moral mode of a player is not subject to
conscious deliberation, but is triggered by some moral responsiveness mechanism, which
might depend on the experimental treatment, the gifts received from other players, and
possibly by the number of rounds to go.
13Based on this general idea, we model the decision making process of a randomly selected
player as a two-stage procedure: In stage A, her moral mode is determined by a random draw
from a probability distribution which represents the moral responsiveness mechanism, and in
stage B, she makes a Bayesian rational decision if she is in the egoistic mode, or transfers a
positive amount if she is in the non-egoistic (or social) mode. In stage A, the probability of
selecting the non-egoistic mode is determined by a function PA, which may depend on the
treatment (country and information), the player position (1 and 2) and the round (1,2,..,IS).
For player 2 in the information treatment, it may also depend on the transfer received from
player 1. In stage B, a transfer by a non-egoistic player is represented as a random draw from
another probability distribution PB on the set (0,1,2,...,7} of possible transfers. This
probability distribution is also allowed to vary with the treatment and the player position, but
is restricted to be constant over rounds, since there is no a priori reason to believe that the
players' attitudes to reciprocity will change during the experiment. However, for player 2 in
the information treatments, we must allow Pg to depend on the transfer received from player
l in order to represent reciprocal behaviour by player 2. Note that the Bayesian rational
decision in stage B is always to give a zero amount, except for player 1 in the information
treatment, who must consider the reciprocity and moral responsiveness of player 2.
Given this model, one would expect to see no difference between the behaviour of players 1
and 2 in the no-information treatment, because the strategic situation is identical for both
players in that treatment. Turning next to the information treatment, one would expect to see
a positive correlation between the transfer levels of the two players, because higher transfers
by player 1 increase the probability of triggering the non-egoistic mode of player 2. This in
tum suggests that the transfers by player I will be higher than those by player 2, because it
might be rational for a player 1 who ís in the egoistic mode to try to trigger the social mode of
player 2. Moreover, the incentive for player 1 to transfer positive amounts will be grea[er the
greater the degree of reciprocity in the relevant group of players. Hence one would expect to
see a positive relationship between the level of [ransfers by player l, and the degree of
reciprocity among her fellow players. To sum up, our informal model yields the following
testable hypotheses:
HI No difference between the behaviour of player I and 2 in the no-information
treatments.
H2 Higher transfers by player I increase the probability of receiving a positive transfer by
player 2 in the information treatments.
H3 Higher transfers by player I than by player 2 in the information treatments.
H4 Higher group reciprocity increases the transfers made by player 1 in the information
treatments.
iaWe have already seen that the data are consistent with hypotheses Hl and H3, which are
concerned with intergroup relationships between different player positions.
As for H2, the data indicate a positive relationship between T1 and T2 in Norway, but not in
the Netherlands. This can explain why transfers are lower in [he Netherlands than in Norway,
but it does not tell us whe[her this is due to differences in reciprocity among non-egoistic
players, or to differences in the moral responsiveness of the two groups of subjects. Our
results from the no-information treatment indicate that the Dutch and Norwegian subjects are
quite similar on the egoist-altruist dimension, as the fraction of positive transfers is virtually
identical for the two groups of subjects. In order [o tes[ hypothesis H2 and uncover possible
differences in the moral responsiveness of the two groups ofsubjects, we introduce the binary
variable S (for social mode), which is 1 if T2 is positive, and zero otherwise. We then
estimate a logit model of the form
S - PA(T 1,R),
on the data set consisting of all Dutch and Norwegian player pairs under the information
treatment, using a forward selection procedure with all linear and quadratic terms in T1
(transfer by player 1) and R(round number) as potential explanatory variables and a 5 per
cent minimum significance level. This yields a model consisting of the 3 explanatory
variables TI, TIR - TI~R and T1SQ - T1'T1, and with ccefficients as depicted in Table 4."
'' As noted in footnote 12, individual data are not independent because players interac[ repeatedly with each
other. Therefore, one has to be careful when interpreting the regression results. However, the results of this
sectíon illustrate nicely the general conclusions that followed from [he previous analyses wi[h the (independent)
data at the level of the session.












Log of likelihood function: -361.04
Percent correct predictions: 70.5
Table 4 shows that the probability of triggering the social mode of player 2 is an increasing
function of T1, but the marginal effect of T1 is decreasing in T1 and R. Thus, in particular, it
becomes more difficult for player I to trigger a non-egoistic response by player 2 as the game
approaches the final round.
In order to check if there are any systematic differences between the moral responsiveness of
the two groups of subjects, we introduce a dummy DNOR for Norway, and the variables NT1
- T1'DNOR, NT1SQ - T1SQ~`DNOR and NT1R - TIR'DNOR. We then re-estimate the
model and obtain the results depicted in Table 5:
16Table 5. Test of country-spec~c differences















Log of likelihood function: -359.54
Wald chi-square statistic: 2.8968 with 4 df.
P-value: 0.57523
As can be seen from Table S, none of the country-specific variables are individually
significant. Moreover, a joint Wald-test of these variables reveals no significant difference
between the two data sets as regards moral responsiveness. Thus not only do the Dutch and
Norwegian subjects display the same degree of altruism in the constant environment
represented by the no-information treatment, but their moral responsiveness to s[imuli in
terms of varying transfers is also the same. This strongly suggests that the observed
differences in behaviour between the two groups of subjects in the information treatment
must be related to differences in trust and reciprocity among socially inclined subjects, and
not to differences along the altruist-egoist dimension.
To see if this is indeed the case, we consider for each country the set of pairs of players in the
information treatment that display trust and reciprocity, in the sense of transferring positive
amounts to each other. We then regress T2 on T1 for this set of pairs for each country
separately, and take the ccefficient on T1 as a measure of the degree of reciprocity among
altruistic subjects in the given country. The regression results are depicted in Table 6.
i~Table 6. Estimated reciprocity models for the Netherlands and Norway







Tl 0.0795 0.4585 0.5355 5.6400
constant 2.0690 3.7160 1.1086 3.2660
The table shows that the reciprocity coefficient in the Netherlands is not significantly
different from zero, while in Norway it is significant and close to 0.5. It implies that there are
two incentives for Norwegian first players to make positive transfers to player 2: First it
increases the probability of triggering the social behaviour mode of player 2, and second, it
increases the transfer by player 2, given that player 2 is in the non-egoistic mode. In the
Netherlands, however, only the first effect is present, and this explains the relatively low
transfers by player 1 in the Netherlands as a rational response to absence of reciprocity, and
the low transfers by player 2 as the result of low transfers by player 1 triggering few non-
egoistic player 2's. Our results are thus consistent with hypothesis H4, which states that
higher group reciprocity increases the transfers made by player 1 in the treatments with
information.
6. Concluding discussion
In this paper we have presented the results of a cross-cultural study of a bilateral gift
exchange experiment. The experiment is designed such that gift giving is mutually beneficial
but individually costly. The results of two treatments of this experiment are compared for
Norway and the Netherlands. In the information trea[ment the second player was informed
about the gift of the first player when she had to decide on her retum gift to the first player
(sequential decision-making). In the no-information treatment, the second player was not
informed about the gift of the first player (simultaneous decision-making). So, although in
both treatments players can have trust in the other player(s) and can behave altruistically,
reciprocating gifts based on observed behaviour is only possible in the treatment with
information.
18The main results are as follows. In all treatments average gifts are positive, which contrasts
the unique Nash prediction. FurthetTnore, both in Norway and in [he Netherlands, average
gifts are higher in the information treatments, which is completely due to the relatively high
gift by the first player in this treatment. The results from the no-informa[ion treatment suggest
that the Dutch and Norwegian subjects behave equally altruistically. In the information
treatment, the main difference between the results for the Netherlands and Norway is the
observed degree of reciprocity. In both countries first players in this treatment seemed rather
confident that the second player would reciprocate, i.e. would reward relatively high gifts by
the first player by high retum gifts. However, only in Norway this turned out to be the case,
and only to some extent. Here a systematic and significantly positive correlation between the
gift received and the gift returned can be found, whereas in the Netherlands the retum gift T2
is almost completely independent of Tl. That is, Du[ch second players largely exploit the
trust placed in them. The Norwegian data, on the other hand, support the presence of a strong
fuiu~ of reciprocity.
These and other features of the data can be captured by the proposed model of individual
behaviour. Our informal model states that in each decision situation, a player can be in one of
two possible moral modes, an egoistic mode, or a non-egoistic (or social) one. If a player is in
the egoistic mode, he acts to maximise his own pay-off, while in the social mode, his acts are
based on social considerations like altruism and reciprocity. The moral mode of a player is
triggered by some moral responsiveness mechanism, which might depend on the
experimental treatment, the gifts received from other players, and possibly by the number of
rounds to go. We have estimated this model in two stages. In stage A we specify a logit
model to estimate the probability of triggering the non-egoistic mode as a function of the first
transfer and the round. In stage B the degree of reciprocity among socially inclined subjects
was estimated by regressing the transfer by the second player on the transfer by the first
player. The results indicate that no differences exist between Norway and the Netherlands
with respect to stage A: Conditional on the stimulus received, the probability of being in the
social mode is equal for Dutch and Norwegian subjects. The results for stage B aze different,
however. The coefficient of Tl, which is an indicator for the degree of reciprocity, is
significantly positive in Norway, whereas in the Netherlands, it is not significantly different
from zero.
The results suggest that Dutch and Norwegian subjects are similar along the alttvist-egoist
dimension, but different with respect to the degree of reciprocity. As suggested by social
identity theory, the fact that the Norwegian subject pool is more homogeneous [han the Dutch
one may be responsible for this result. The Norwegian and Dutch participants differed in two
19dimensions, a much more homogeneous population in Norway and a more homogeneous
Norwegian subjec[ pool, namely economics students. In this respect it is worthwhile to
mention that we have not found any difference in behaviour between economics students and
other students in the Dutch treatments. It is therefore quite possible that cross-cultural
differences are responsible for the results presented in this paper.
To what extent do our results fit into results of related experiments? On the one hand, such a
low degree of reciprocity as obtained in our Dutch infotmation treatment is rare in the
experimental literature; Ortmann et al. (1996) in their replication of Berg et al.`s investment
game experiment belong to the few exceptions who attribute only a minor role to trust and
reciprocity. On the other hand, the observed degree of reciprocity in the Norwegian
information treatment is comparable to the results from similar experiments, such as Berg et
al. (1995) and Fehr et al. (1993, 1997 and 1998). The results from our study do not
unambiguously support one of the opposing views on the roles of social norms. They
underline, however, that people may behave differendy, even in identical situations.
This brings us to the question of the possible effect of cross-cultural differences. Thus far,
only a few experimental studies have been conducted that focus directiy on a cross-cultural
comparison. Unfortunately, the results of, for example, the investment game conducted by
Berg et aL (1995) and Ortmann et aL (1996) are hard to compaze because of differences in the
experimental set-up, the instructions, etcetera. Their results illustrate, however, that findings
may be quite sensitive to the context chosen. Similarly, it is hard to relate the results of the
gift exchange game of Fehr et aL (1998), which strongly suggest that reciprocity motives are
important, to the present findings. Yet, our experimental designs were identical in Norway
and the Netherlands, which allows for a fair comparison, like in Roth e[ al. (1991)'s study.
Roth et al. suggest that differences in bargaining behaviour could be attributed to cultural
differences. We claim that the findings of our gift exchange experiment, which is also a kind
of bargaining situation, may be explained by cross-cultural differences as well.
The tentative conclusion might then be that even in countries that look quite similar, like
Norway and the Netherlands, people might have different norms and values. Or, to put it
differently, people may react differendy when exposed to similar (decision-) situations. The
policy implication for a unified Europe could be that one has to be careful when rules of
social security systems, for example, are modified or harmonised among counties. What
people in one country consider being fair, is not necessarily judged similarly by people from
other countries.
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zaAppendix A
Table A.1 Transfers and pay-offs at the level of the session for Norw
treatment session Tl T2 '~z(T1tT2) Pl P2 '~z(P1tP2)
2 2.67 1.93 2.30 17.77 25.10 21.43
4 1.18 1.32 1.25 18.17 16.83 17.50
No 6 1.57 1.07 1.32 I5.85 20.85 18.35
informa[ion 8 0.63 0.70 0.67 14.60 13.93 14.27
l0 1.12 1.02 1.07 16.33 17.33 16.83
average 1.42 1.21 L32 16.54 18.81 17.68
1 3.38 1.60 2.49 14.22 32.00 23.11
3 2.78 1.17 1.98 12.85 29.02 20.93
Information 5 3.33 1.33 2.33 12.57 32.57 22.57
7 1.83 0.58 1.21 11.22 23.72 ]7.47
9 2.82 1.22 2.02 13.87 29.87 21.87
11 2.42 0.60 I.51 10.10 28.27 19.18
average 2.73 1.06 1.90 12.39 29.12 20.76
Table A.2 Transfers and pay-offs at the level of the session
treatment session T1 T2 'Iz(T1tT2) P1 P2 '~z(P1tP2)
1 0.40 0.43 0.42 12.35 12.02 12.18
2 1.53 1.32 1.42 17.70 19.87 18.78
No 3 1.28 1.20 1.24 16.77 17.60 17.18
information 4 0.78 1.17 0.97 18.22 14.38 16.30
5 0.93 1.03 0.98 16.13 15.13 15.63
average 0.99 1.03 1.01 16.23 I5.80 16.02
6 1.87 0.47 1.17 10.78 24.78 17.78
7 2.28 0.42 1.35 9.12 27.78 18.45
Information 8 1.63 1.10 1.36 15.82 21.15 18.48
9 2.22 0.65 1.43 10.68 26.35 18.52
10 2.50 0.97 1.73 12.87 28.20 20.53
average 2.10 0.72 1.41 11.85 25.65 18.75




0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 total
0 54 1 0 0 1 0 0 5 61
I 15 5 0 1 0 0 I 0 22
2 26 0 8 2 0 0 0 0 36
3 48 7 10 15 3 0 1 0 84
4 74 3 6 13 28 0 0 0 124
5 6 0 0 0 5 1 0 0 12
6 I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
7 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 I 5
total 227 16 25 31 37 I 2 6 345




0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 to[al
0 99 19 16 II 7 3 1 5 161
I 12 3 3 3 I 0 1 1 24
2 21 3 4 1 2 1 0 2 34
3 14 2 5 3 5 1 0 1 31
4 14 0 5 7 4 1 0 0 31
5 4 0 0 1 0 I 0 0 6
6 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
7 9 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 11
total 175 28 33 26 20 7 2 9 300
24Table A5: Frequency table of first and second transfers in the Du
T2
Tl
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 total
0 78 0 2 1 3 0 0 7 ql
1 19 3 1 0 0 0 0 1 24
2 35 7 3 0 1 0 0 0 46
3 42 3 7 14 0 0 0 1 67
4 40 7 4 4 6 0 0 0 61
5 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
total 223 22 17 19 10 0 0 9 300
Table A6: Frequency table oftirst and second transfers in the Dutch no-information
T2
T1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 total
0 100 32 22 11 4 0 0 6 175
1 20 7 7 5 2 0 0 0 41
2 16 4 9 6 3 0 0 0 38
3 12 3 9 3 0 0 0 0 27
4 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 7
5 5 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 7
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 j
total 160 50 48 26 9 0 0 7 300
25Appendix B: Instructions
Introduction (read aloud only)
You aze about to participate in an experimental study of decision-making. The experiment will last for about
one hour. The instructions of the ezperiment aze simple and if you follow them carefully and make good
decisions you may eam a coasiderable amount of money. All the money you eam will be yours to keep and
will be paid to you, privately and confidentially, in cash right afrer the end of the experiment
{For the experiment it is of crucial impottance to have 8 participants. However, ezperience shows that often
l or 2 persons do not show up or do not show up in time. Therefore, we need to have 10 instead of 8
subscriptions. This sometimes has, as now, the consequence that too many panicipants are present and that
f or 2 persons cannot participate in this experiment. These persons can still put their name down for one of
the following experiments and receive f 10 for any inconvenience. These persons are determined by lot
because one or two blank envelopes aze added to the boz with seating numbers, tuiless one of you checks in
voluntarily not to participate in the experiment and receiveJ 10 instead.}
Before we go on with the instructions, I would like to ask all of you to draw an envelope from this
box and open it. The number denotes the terminal you have to be seated. {If you draw a blank envetope you
cannot panicipate in the experiment and you receive f 10.}
We will distribute the instructions of the experiment now and read through them together. After
that, you will have the opportunity to ask questions. From now on, you are requested not to talk to, or
communicate with, any other participant.
InstruCtit)ns (distributed and read aloud)'
Decisioas and earnings
The experiment ezists of fifteen separate rounds. In every round, each of you will earn a cenain amount of
points. At the end of the experiment the points earned in the l5 rounds are added up for each participant
sepazately. Every point earned is worth 5 eent (-S 0.028) at the end of the experiment. In addition to this,
all panicipants receive a fixed extra amount of f 5. Your total eamings will thus be equal to f 5 plus the
number of points earned times 5 cent. Now, we describe how the points eamed in each round will be
determined.
In each round you will be matched with another participant. Each round will consist of two
periods. In every round you have in one period the role of Decider and in the other period the role of
Receiver. The earnings of a panicipant in a round are determined by the final assets of a participant in the
period in which he or she is a Decider, and by the final assets of the panicipant in the period in which he or
she is a Receiver. We denote the final assets as Receiver by Ed and the fmal assets as Decider by Ee. The
earnings in points of a participant in a round aze determined by the product of the final assets as Receiver
and the final assets as Decider. The earnings of a participant in a round are thus equal to Ea x Fb points.
Nezt, we describe how the final assets as Decider EB and the final assets as Receiver Eb are determined.
In each round the participants aze first randomly matched two by two. After thaz the computer
determines for each couple who will be the Decider in the first period and who will be the Decider in the
second period. In the second period the roles aze reversed: the Decider in the first period is thus the
Receiver in the second period and the Receiver in the first period is the Decider in of the second period.
The Receiver starts with an endowment of l, whereas [he Decider starts wi[h and endowment of 9. The
Decider has to decide which pan of his or her endowment that he or she wants to transfer to the Receiver.
This transfer, which we will denote by T, is 0 at the minimum, and 7 at the maximum. After the Decider
has decided about the transfer T to the Receiver, the fmal assets of the Receiver aze Fro-1 tT, and those of
the Decider are EB-9-T. After the Decider has decided about her or his transfer to the Receiver, the second
period of the round will be started, in which the roles are reversed.
In the second period, the other participant of the couple, who is the Decider now, will have to
make a decision. The determination of the fmal assets of the new Receiver and Decider in this period is
' 1'he tezt be[ween square brackets (()) is added in infomta[ion condition two ("full inforrttation'). The [ez[
between brackets ({J) is added when more than 8 participants show up.
26similar to the previous period. The Receiver stans with an endowment of 1 and the Decider starts with an
endowment of 9. The Decider decides again on the part of her or his endowment that will be transferred to
the Receiver. Thís transfer T determines the final assets of both participants in the second period: Eo-1 tT
for the Receiver and EB-9-T for the Decider.
As said, your eatnings in a round aze detennined by the product of your final assets EB in your role
of Decider and the final assets Eo in your role of Receiver. Your assets EB aze dependent on your transfer
to the Receiver in the period you are Decider and your assets E.e are dependent on the transfer from the
Decider to you in the period you aze Receiver. To facilitate the detetmination of your eamings, you may
use the table below.
The table states your eatnings in points in a round dependent on the transfer jrom you to the
Receiver when you are Decider and the transfer to you by the Decider when you are Receiver. In thís table
the rows present the transfer from you as Decider to the Receiver and the columns present the transfer to
you as Receiver from the Decider. When you first look for the transfer from you in the row and then go to
the right to the column stating the transfer to you, you can read your earnings in poin[s, E.a z F.e, for the








Transfer to you from the Decider when you are Receiver
. . . ..............:.................:.............. .............
0 1 2 3 4 S 6 7
9 18 ` : 27 : 36 : 4S ' S4 ; 63 : 72 ................................................. .............
8 16 : 24 : 32 ; 40 ; 48 ; S6 . 64 , ..................................................... . . ..........................
7 l4 : 21 ': 28 : 3S : 42 : 49 ! S6 ................................................... . . ..........................
6 12 ~ 18 ; 24 : 30 : 36 : 42 : 48 .......:.................:.................:.................:.............. .......... .......... ............ , ...:.... ...:.... ...;....
S : 10 : 1S ; 20 : 2S : 30 : 3S : 40
: . . . :............... . . ..........................................
4 8 12 : 16 ` 20 : 24 ; 28 : 32 ............................................... . . ...........................
3 6 9 12 : 1S : 18 : 21 : 24
. .................................................... . ........
2 4 6 , 8 , 10 ; 12 14 - l6
When the two period in a round are over, so when both participants have decided on a transfer, a new
round will be staned.
Procedure and usage of the computer
After we have gone through the instructions, first a practice round will be tun. After the practice round, the
fifteen rounds that determine your eamings for this experiment will be tvn.
In every round the computer, in a completely random manner, first determines who will be
matched to whom. Then the computer determines, again in a random matmer, for each couple who will get
the role of Receiver and Decider in the first period. Ott the upper left pan of the screen the Decider will see
the number of the current round and the message ' You aze now Decider in the first period". Undemeath
the Decider will see the question "How much of your endowment do you transfer (0-7)?" The Decider has
to type an integer from 0 up to and including 7. The number typed is the transfer T to the Receiver with
whom he has been matched in this round.
Nezt, the current Decider will be asked the question "How much do you expect to receive?". Here,
the Decider types an integer from 0 up to and including 7, dependent on her or his ezpectation about the
transfer she or he expects to receive as Receiver ín the nezt period. This ezpectation is used by us when
analyzing the ezperiment, but your eamings will be unaffbcted by it. Besides, the other panicipants are not
infonned about your expectations stated.
After all Deciders have made a decision, the first period is over. In the sewnd period the Receivers
of the first period are now the Deciders. Every new Decider will see on the scrcen that in this round he or
27she is Decider in the second period [and how much 6e or she has reuived in the previous period].
Undemeath there is the question "How much of your endowment do you transfer (0-7)?. The Decider has to
rype an integer from 0 up to and including 7. The number typed is the transfer T to the Receiver with
whom he has been ma[ched in this round. When all Deciders of the second period have made a decision all
participants will see how much they have received and what their earnings for the rounds are. These
eanungs are in points and are equal to the product of the final assets as Decider and the final assets as
Receiver: EB x Eo. After one has been informed about this, the round is over and a new round will be
started.
In the new round, the computer again dctermines first who will be matched with whom and next
for each couple who will be the first Decider. So, you do not know with whom you are matched in a
particular round and whether you will be the first or the sewnd Decider.
Summary
The experiment consis[s of 15 rounds, and every round consists of 2 periods. [n each round the participants
aze randomly matched two by two by the computer. In each round every participant has in one period the
role of Decider and in the o[her period the role of Receiver. When you are Decider your endowment is 9
and your final assets depend on your transfer T to the Receiver: F.B-9-T. When you are Receiver your
endowment is 1 and your final assets depend on the transfer T by the Decider to you: Eo-1tT. Your
earnings in points in a round are determined by the product of your fmal assets as Decider and your final
assets as Receivec: F.a x Eo. After the first period of a round is over the new Deciders are informed about
the transfer T which they have received in the first period. Afrer both periods in a round have been
finished, everybody is informed about the transfer T[o him or her and his or her eamings in that round.
The matching of the participants and the order in which participants are Decider in the two periods
of a round are determined by the computer in a completely random way time afrer time. You will never be
able to know whether you will be the first or the second Decider in a particular rounds, or with whom you
are matched in a particular round.
Final remarks
After the last round, you will first be requested to answer some questions to evaluate the experiment. This
questionnaire is anonymous. We can link your answers to your seat number but not to your name. Afrer
that, you will be called by your seat number to receive your eamings privately and confidentially. Your
earnings are your own business; you do not need to discuss wi[h anyone. I[ is no[ allowed to talk to or
communicate with other participants during the experiment in either way.
On your table you will find an empty sheet, which you can use to take notes. Additionally, you will
find a sheet labelled "REMARKS". On this sheet you can make remarks about the instructions or your
decisions.
You ge[ a couple of minutes to go through the instructions and [o ask questions. When you want to
ask something, please raise your hand. One of us will come to your table to speak to you.
Afrer that we will start the practice round.
Are there any questions?
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